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 The Legitimacy of the Contemporary  
Paul Rabinow∗ 
»The only question that remains is the sense in which science (Wissenschaft) gives ›no‹ answer, and 
whether or not science (Wissenschaft) might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question 
correctly.« (Weber 1946: 143)1 
The initial mapping and sequencing of the human and other genomes during the 
course of the 1990s was an event; in its wake almost everyone seems to agree that 
we are on the verge of something momentous and extravagant. In English, »verge« 
means the boundary beyond which something happens or changes. The sequence, it 
is true, is only one in a larger series of recent bravura, techno-scientific accom-
plishments, that individually and in an accumulative fashion, raise a host of unset-
tling and unsettled issues ranging from the scientific, to the ontological, to the ethi-
cal, to the political. Today, there is ferocious contestation over whether these 
achievements are: (a) transgressing a boundary whose integrity we must respect; or 
(b) crossing over a threshold leading to unforeseen encounters and challenges; or (c) 
simply moving from one farmer’s field to the next (the original meaning of verge) 
and thereby basically issues of private property and the commons. But how is one 
to decide where one is? And where one is going?  
To put the question another way: how is one to decide: what difference does 
today introduce with respect to yesterday? That formulation, of course, is how 
Michel Foucault, two decades ago, rephrased the question – »What is Enlighten-
ment?« – posed by Immanuel Kant’s two centuries earlier (Foucault 1984: 34). The 
core claim of this paper is that to better understand the question, the stakes, and 
hopefully the way to proceed, – Kant’s famous »exit«, »Ausgang«, from immaturity – 
we require something like an anthropology of the contemporary.  
A variant of the question Foucault posed, albeit in a quite different form, can be 
found in the great work of Hans Blumenberg, especially his magnum opus, The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Arguing against Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, 
Karl Lowith, and others who saw in modern forms of self-assertion and reason, 
—————— 
 ∗  Anmerkung des Herausgebers: Paul Rabinow gibt hier nicht seine Kasseler Mittagsvorlesung wieder, 
sondern widmet sich der Frage nach der »Legitimacy of the Contemporary«. 
 1  My gratitude to James Faubion and Tobias Rees. 
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dangerous nihilism or self-deluding attempts to overcome Christianity while only 
furthering its deepest essence through the process of secularization, Blumenberg’s 
book is a plea and justification, an apologia, an éloge, for a distinctive space of 
inquiry, one that is affirmative of a modern ethos. Blumenberg’s legitimacy of mod-
ernity is as well a variant of the legitimacy of the contemporary, a call to remain 
open to the present, against narratives of decline, disaster, and other forms of clo-
sure. For Blumenberg, the difference that constitutes modernity’s legitimacy, and 
possibly an Ausgang, is a critical one: once one finds oneself on the verge of casting 
the present in epochal terms (as a historical totality), as we have become accus-
tomed to do since the nineteenth century, one must cease and desist; once one finds 
oneself attempting to answer the old metaphysical and theological problems with 
which so much Western philosophy is still enmeshed, one should pause and attempt 
to ask, with more precision – what is the problem that makes a difference now? By 
so doing, it might be possible to affirm a form of conceptual curiosity and appro-
priate self-assertion about and within the contemporary. Dare to know! But only 
those things that can be known.  
Odo Marquard, in his Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie, carries these 
reflections forward by questioning how we could think about change without a 
philosophy of history; and produce an anthropology without a fixed conception of 
Man. These questions are precisely the domain of an anthropology of reason 
and/or an anthropology of the contemporary. Such an anthropology, however, 
would explore more heterogeneous territory than the largely conceptual terrain to 
which thinkers like Blumenberg and Marquard restrict themselves. Today, anthro-
pos is in question; this questioning has multiple dimensions to it. One of those 
dimensions, but only one, is the rise of a powerful new set of sciences. Thus, it is 
unequivocally the case that the logos of bios is currently in the process of rapid 
transformation. A central question before us today therefore is: given a changing 
biology, what logos is appropriate for anthropos? And how should that logos be 
practiced so as to increase our capacities without intensifying the myriad relations of 
brutalization that are so pervasive in to our times? Brutalization: the act of treating 
something viciously, without care. The older meaning refers to the state of existence 
of animals and lower races; the contemporary meaning refers to how these living 
beings are treated by the civilized and humane. And the consequences for those 
doing so.  
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2000. Drosophila Lessons  
There is little doubt that the March 24, 2000 issue of Science entitled The Drosophila 
Genome marks a threshold. The humble fruit fly has been the twentieth century’s 
organism of choice for studying genetics. Its centrality has persisted from its early 
fame at Columbia University, where it was chosen as a model organism in part 
because its reproductive habits fit the academic calendar, up to the present, when a 
hybrid consortium of public university labs (especially Berkeley) and the controver-
sial biotechnology company Celera Genomics, chose Drosophila as a demonstration 
project for their genome mapping strategies. Celera did so in part to prove to its 
competitors (especially the US government funded university/philanthropy consor-
tium mapping the human genome) the power of its sequencing approach. The 
Drosophila sequence was also presented as a gift to science (free CD-ROMs are 
available), a token of this early twenty first century triumph of utter technological 
power. More has been learned in the three years about Drosophila genetics than 
had been painstaking accumulated in the previous seventy-five. Thus, the »Droso-
phila Genome« issue of Science, contains much to ponder for geneticists and for 
non-geneticists alike.2 And, of course, it wasn’t long, before Science published its 
special issue on The Human Genome.  
One of the elder statesmen of genetics, the Nobel Prize winner, Sydney 
Brenner, in a trenchant summary piece, preceding the »The Drosophila Genome« 
insert, aptly entitled »The End of the Beginning«, brilliantly frames the significance 
of the current conjuncture in genetics. Brenner, himself the leader of the project to 
map the worm, C. Elegans, opens his article by observing that: »In classical experi-
mental genetics, we could not assert the existence of a wild-type gene until a mutant 
version with an altered function had been isolated. But«, he continues, »if one asked 
how many genes were required to make a bacteriophage or a bacterium or a fly or a 
mouse, no answer could be given«. (Brenner 2000: 2173) Classical geneticists could 
never have produced a The Drosophila Genome special issue because although they 
had developed techniques to isolate and map »genes«, classical genetics had no 
concept equivalent to what is today called »a genome«. Consequentially, it is not 
surprising that no answer was given to a question that could not be scientifically, 
posed: what is a genome?  
Just as »genes« and »genomics« are not the same thing, so too, »genes« and 
»DNA« are not the same thing. In fact, DNA plays an intermediary role between 
genes and genomes. The major shift that eventuated in the invention, discovery, and 
—————— 
 2  Science, 24 March 2000, The Drosophilia Genome, vol. 287. Although there is an excellent history of 
Drosophilia genetics, Robert E. Kohler (1994), »Lords of the Flies: Drosophilia Genetics and the 
Experimental Life«, Chicago, it is not mentioned in the entire issue of Science. 
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mapping of genomes during the 1990s arguably began with the shift from »genes« 
to »DNA«. Following the discoveries of the 1950s and 1960s in which the funda-
mentals of the double helix and genetic code were painstakingly unraveled, the 
1970s and 1980s saw the invention of a series of technologies devoted to manipu-
lating DNA (regardless of its function); the most important were DNA sequencing, 
cloning DNA in bacteria, and the polymerase chain reaction (referred to as ›in vitro‹ 
cloning) a technique that enabled the rapid, efficient, and inexpensive production of 
large quantities of specific DNA sequences. With the invention of PCR at Cetus 
Corporation, a scarcity of DNA available for experimentation turned into a bounty 
of DNA available for experimentation. The 1970s and 1980s were also the decades 
during which the material conditions of production of truth in molecular biology, 
biochemistry and genetics were undergoing, not coincidentally, equally significantly 
changes. These were the decades of the emergence of the bio-technology industry – 
the end of an elite, artisan, craft culture in biology, even in the recently forged spe-
cialty of molecular biology and its rapid replacement with a distinctive type of heav-
ily machine mediated, costly mode of quasi-industrial production, replete with a 
much larger and more functionally diverse labor force including computer techni-
cians, lawyers, CEOs and advertising agencies. Joining the crowded world of DNA 
was another new player, bioethicists. While companies such as Genentech, Cetus 
and Biogen were shaping the field; the university world was itself moving signifi-
cantly closer to this new industrial mode of operation. By 1989, it was daring but 
plausible for the United States National Institutes of Health and Department of 
Energy (involved in radiation research since the dropping of the atomic bombs in 
Japan) to announce a Human Genome Initiative, designed to map (and eventually 
sequence) the human genome – defined ambiguously as the total complement of 
DNA in a human cell – and thereby it was proclaimed to bring health and prosper-
ity – eventually – to many. 
Today, 14 years later, a series of genomes have been mapped through massively 
funded, international, industry-government-university-philanthropy consortia. Many 
consequences and questions flow along with this achievement. Prominent among 
them is a contemporary rethinking of the »gene«. Scientifically speaking, »genes« are 
not what they used to be. Brenner ruefully remarks, »Old geneticists knew what they 
were talking about when they used the term ›gene‹, but it seems to have been cor-
rupted by modern genomics to mean any piece of expressed sequence«. Instead of 
the misleading and anachronistic term »gene«, Brenner proposes to substitute the 
term »genetic locus« to indicate »either an open reading frame or a site to map 
mutations«. (Brenner 2000: 2174) An open reading frame is »a DNA sequence that 
potentially can be translated into protein«. It should be no surprise to learn that 
proteomics companies are appearing and calls for inventories of proteins are 
increasingly mentioned as vital.  
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The full impact of this conceptual shift in our understanding of living beings has 
not achieved an adequate place in public understanding given all the attention that 
the media has lavished on the »gene for« this, that, and the other thing, as well as 
such hot button issues, seemingly rife with epochal significance, such as »patenting 
life«, (remember that) »cloning humans«, and »genetically modified foods«. In fact, 
the gene for this-that-and-the-other-thing should probably been seen as one of the 
last triumphs of what Brenner calls »classical genetics«. It is eminently worthwhile 
underscoring Brenner’s point that locating genes is not the same thing as mapping 
or sequencing genomes. Furthermore, those engaged in the latter enterprise are 
perfectly clear that these stages are only an initial step in understanding them. Once 
the genomes are mapped and sequenced and once the basic proteomic cataloging 
work is accomplished, the functional biology will only just have begun. Brenner 
observes that these maps are static. None of the information in them as it is cur-
rently collected tells us when genes are switched on and off and for how long. Such 
information, Brenner observes, is »absolutely essential (…) because in complex 
organisms, evolution does not proceed by enlarging the protein inventory but by 
modulating the expression of genes«.  
In an equally stunning summing up of the state of comparative genomics in the 
year 2000 the head of the Berkeley Drosophila project, Gerald Rubin, and a host of 
co-authors presented the first overviews of the »Comparative Genomics of the 
Eukaryotes«3 Rubin and colleagues set out a series of initial insights that are in many 
ways counter-intuitive and quite surprising. Let me just list some of them:  
(a)  Drosophila has a proteome only twice the size of that of yeast. And, despite the 
large differences between fly and worm in terms of development and morphol-
ogy, they use a core proteome of similar size«.4 
(b)  Complexity and number of genes are not directly correlated »There is presently 
no practical way to quantify differences in biological complexity between two 
organisms«. 
(c)  »Genes with similar functional assignment in the Gene Ontology classification 
do not appear to be clustered in the genome«. 
(d)  Human Disease Genes. A list was compiled of 289 genes that are mutated, 
altered, amplified, or deleted in a diverse set of human disease and searched for 
similar diseases in the three genomes. Of these 289 human genes, 177 (61%) 
appear to have an ortholog in Drosophila. Of the human cancer genes surveyed, 
—————— 
 3  Gerald Rubin, Suzanna Lewis et al, »Comparative Genomics of the Eukaryotes«, Drosophilia 
melanogaster, Caenorhabditis elegans, Saccharomyces cervisiae. (protein domains, (2) intracellular 
networks, (3) cell-cell interactions). 
 4  Rubin, »Comparative«, (Haemophilus = 1425, Yeast = 4383 proteins, fly = 8065, worm = 9453). 
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68 percent appear to have Drosophila orthologs. Numerous orthologs of neuro-
logical genes are also found in the Drosophila genome. 
(e)  Drosophila’s utility, as an experimental site will only increase. Many of the human 
disease genes are found in only a single copy in the fly and hence there is less 
ambiguity about their function. Gene manipulation in the fly is easy and can 
demonstrate possible genetic therapeutic approaches. We anticipate the 
increased use of such ›humanized‹ fly models.5 
(f)  The human genome, with 80,000 or so genes, is likely to be an amplified version 
of a very much smaller genome, and its core proteome may not be much larger 
than that of the fly or worm; that is, the more complex attributes of human 
beings are achieved using largely the same molecular components. The evolu-
tion of additional complex attributes is essentially an organizational one: a mat-
ter of novel interactions that derive from the temporal and spatial segregation of 
fairly similar components«. 
Notice, please, that in the year 2000 Rubin’s estimate of the number of human 
genes was off by at least an order of magnitude. In the fall of 2003, Affymetrix, a 
Silicon Valley company announced a gene chip that would monitor expression 
patterns of all the genes in the human genome. This task was facilitated by the fact 
that the number of genes to monitor is about one third of what was expected. 
However, as Stephen Fodor, the founder and CEO of Affymetrix, told me in Sep-
tember 2003, since the coding regions of the genome represent only about two 
percent of the DNA, there is much work left to be done on what the rest of the 
genome is doing. Of course since then the discovery of interference RNA has led to 
a more precise understanding of splicing processes and a burgeoning set of start-up 
companies.  
Scientific knowledge, even its fundamental truths, changes. Accepting that con-
dition is what makes science a difficult and challenging vocation. Those not ready to 
live within such instability with its pleasures and frustrations, as Weber taught us, 
should seek other work.  
The Future of Human Nature  
Germany’s most distinguished philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, in his manifesto, The 
Future of Human Nature, boldly answers the call to come to terms with recent events 
taking place in the life sciences as well as in ethics. In his book, rather surprisingly 
—————— 
 5  »Comparative« (ref. 57), J.M. Warrick et al. (1999), Nature Genetics, vol. 23, p. 425. 
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he does not take up the life sciences at all. He chooses to cast the question of ethics 
as a dilemma formulated by the following rhetorical question: 
»Do we want to treat the categorically new possibility of intervening in the human genome as an 
increase in freedom that requires normative regulation – or rather as self-empowerment for trans-
formations that depend simply on our preferences and do not require any self-limitation?« 
(Habermas 2003: 12) 
The question is a rhetorical one in the sense that the way Habermas posed it he has 
already answered it. He devotes the core of his short book to making arguments in 
favor of banning intervention in the human genome (now and forever). Habermas’ 
conclusion, although not the reasons for it, is basically the same one as that of 
Frances Fukuyama and Leon Kass, both formerly members of President Bush’ 
National Commission on Bio-Ethics, which is to point out that similar intellectual 
and moral positions can be held by people spanning the political spectrum. 
Although I disagree with this position, there is no doubt that it must receive the 
attention of anthropologists today for, when all is said and done, what is at stake is 
an understanding of – and an attitude toward – anthropos and of logos.  
There are a series of claims, both explicit and implicit, in Habermas’s question. 
– Intervening in the human genome is categorically new. 
– That freedom is quantitative. 
– That there are norms to guide regulation. 
– That there is an existing »we« who could judge such matters and legislate them. 
– That such decisions stem from desires. 
– That choices arising from preferences are simple. 
– That such choices refer to the self. 
– That practices of the self do not entail ethical limitations. 
– That the possibilities are either normative regulations of a »we« or preferences 
of a »self«. 
– The way to think about these questions is abstractly. 
He appears to posit two human natures: a biological one that he equates with the 
genome (although we are told nothing about what he considers the genome to be); 
the second is a human nature exterior to the genome as well as being qualitatively 
different from it. Identity, the capacity for healthy human relations, and individual 
self-worth, all depend on the genome remaining untouched in a state of nature; it is 
only when that condition of inviolability is met that we can be assured that our 
autonomy and freedom are protected, or at least the conditions are in place for it to 
be so. On the face of it, each of these claims is dubious and far from self-evident. 
As anthropologists, however, no native claims should be taken as absurd a priori – 
after all our discipline has spent years unraveling the complex semiotics that make a 
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speech act possible and coherent whereby an Amazonian tribesman claims to be a 
parakeet. Here, as with the Bororo, we seem to be dealing with a worldview. Or at 
least that is how anthropology has traditionally cast such matters.  
Habermas’ book is a social fact. It is a part of a distinctive contemporary moral 
landscape. This landscape is not external (as Habermas seems to assume) to the 
current re-configuration of »anthropos;« bio-ethics and biosciences are in a relation-
ship, often a discordant one, but still a relationship. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate 
for an anthropologist to map the reconfigurations of the logos of anthropos and thus 
to analyze Habermas’s intervention as part of contemporary affairs.  
In terms of cultural history, there is nothing opaque about Habermas’ position; 
it is essentially a lightly modified version of the nineteenth century understanding, 
widespread in German philosophic circles, that technology and nature are ontologi-
cally separate realms that must be kept epistemologically and morally distinct. In the 
Kantian tradition, nature is the realm of necessity and reason the realm of freedom. 
Although Habermas emphatically affirms that distinction, he also introduces a vari-
ant of Hegelianism as well:  
»Subjectivity, being what makes the human body a soul-possessing receptacle of the spirit, it itself 
constituted through inter-subjective relations to others. The individual self will only emerge 
through the course of social externalization, and can only be stabilized with the network of 
undamaged relations of mutual recognition.« (Habermas 2003: 34) 
Habermas states and restates his position in a remarkable variety of ways: perhaps 
he is not yet sure which formulation is the best one; perhaps he recognizes that the 
formulations themselves are unstable and don’t bear much intellectual scrutiny. The 
advances of molecular biology appear to be making it possible to intervene in fun-
damental regulatory mechanisms of living beings. We must beware, however, as this 
capacity may lead us places we do not normatively want to go. We need critical 
limits because there is a danger of »obliterating the boundary between persons and 
things«. In the light of this diagnosis, Habermas’ basic imperative follows logically: 
»This kind of intervention should be exercised only over things, not persons.« 
(Habermas 2003: 13) Although this imperative sounds like Kant, old Kant was just 
a shade less categorical than Habermas: Kant says: »So act as to treat humanity, 
whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, 
never as a means only«. (Kant 2004: 46) In my opinion, Kant’s »only« adds a crucial 
space of reflection and action.  
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Bio-Ethics: The Question Concerning Humanism  
Habermas’s schema does not seem to have a category of »living beings«. Thus, 
apparently it would be normatively permissible to intervene in the genomes of Dro-
sophila, mice, yeast, and chimps – and to treat them like things. Granted, Habermas 
does express some ambivalence on this point. The tone of the following sentence 
(and others like it) is clearly one of disapproval: »What was hitherto ›given‹ in 
organic nature, and could at most be ›bred‹, now shifts to the realm of artifacts and 
their production.« (Habermas 2003: 12) Habermas speaks of »ruthless intrusion«, 
into nature although there is no evident reason why he chooses to call these prac-
tices »ruthless« and not »caring«. It is striking – and not innocent – that Habermas 
invokes the following example: »It is true that, just like the rationalization of agri-
culture, which was rationalized according to business management principles, the 
technological equipment and up-grading of a health-care system dependent on 
pharmaceutical businesses and medical machinery have been prone to crisis.« 
(Habermas 2003: 46) The »prone to crisis« phrase is a strange one as if pre-capitalist 
peasant agriculture or Socialist agriculture and medical systems were not prone to 
crisis. It is impossible not to hear uncanny echoes here of Heidegger’s claim that 
there is no difference between mechanized agriculture and the concentration camps. 
For these German philosophers at least, admixtures of technology and nature 
remain morally unbearable and, perhaps for that reason, unthinkable.  
Habermas is most concerned with establishing moral boundaries to protect an 
endangered humanity. Habermas basically does seem willing, however reluctantly, 
to accept technological intervention in external nature: »From a life-world perspec-
tive, however, our attitude changes as soon as this extension of our technological 
control crosses the line between ›outer‹ and ›inner‹ nature.« (Habermas 2003: 23) 
The foundation but not the essence of that »inner nature« seems to be genomic. 
Thus:  
»Up until now both the secular thought of European modernity and religious belief could proceed 
on the assumption that the genetic endowment of the newborn infant, and thus the initial organic 
conditions for its future life history, lay beyond any programming and deliberate manipulation on 
the part of other persons.« (Habermas 2003: 13) 
Although this claim is historically dubious, the message is clear. It is debatable 
because the largely secular eugenics movement of both the right wing and the left 
wing certainly wanted to intervene in the genetic endowment of the newborn infant. 
What these movements understood by »genetic endowment« has taken on incom-
patible meanings over the course of the last century. The public health movement 
certainly sought to intervene deliberately and in a regulatory fashion in »the initial 
organic conditions« of life.  
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Habermas identifies a slippery slope so dear to Anglophone ethicists and philoso-
phers and adds to it a bit of apocalyptic rhetoric from old Europe. »Once you start 
to instrumentalize human life, once you start to distinguish between life worth 
living, and life not worth living, you embark on a course where there is no stopping 
point.« (Habermas 2003: 19) 
There is another kind of analytic slippage here, one between an instrumentaliz-
ing of human life, on the one hand, and deciding on which lives are worth living, on 
the other. Surely it is possible for someone to decide (alone, with their family, 
friends, doctors, pastoral care givers) that their life is no longer worth living without 
that decision leading to the concentration camps. To claim otherwise is to retreat 
from the »demands of the day«, as Weber put it. Regardless, for Habermas, the 
remedy is clear. »The abstract morality of reason proper to subjects of human rights 
is itself sustained by a prior ethical self-understanding of the species, which is shared by all 
moral persons.« (Habermas 2003: 40) 
For many of us this statement occasions fear and trembling, shock and awe, and 
above all anger. The idea that there is an a prior ethical self-understanding of the 
species; and that if you don’t share it with Habermas you are not a moral person is, 
to use one of his terms, repugnant.  
There is much to be said about all of this. Here I point out that, as we are no 
longer in the nineteenth century, the resurrection of this old stance perks the curi-
osity of an anthropologist of the contemporary. Habermas activates old concepts to 
encompass and secure the present: precisely his definition of neo-conservatism, one 
he used polemically in other debates. An anthropologist of the contemporary is 
attentive to the issue of »What difference does today make with regard to yester-
day?« This position by no means rejects the use of older concepts, quite the con-
trary, but it does attempt to look at them anew, to refashion them in light of new 
elements and new problems. The ethos of the contemporary contrasts with that of 
the modern; it is not fascinated with the new per se but concerned with the emer-
gence and articulation of forms within which old and new elements take on mean-
ings and functions. Today, there is no doubt that one side of such problems is: how 
might we forge a way of life that does not make a sharp and brutal separation 
between what used to be called nature and culture?  
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Nature  
Georges Canguilhem, in an acerbic article entitled »Nature dénaturée et Nature natur-
ante«6 provides a stern pedagogical lesson to those who hold sentimental views of 
nature’s purity. Canguilhem’s article was written at a time (1976) when ecology was 
gaining a momentary prominence on the French political scene. Canguilhem 
observes Western history has seen sporadic waves of protest against the putative 
»de-naturation of human life in both its means and its ends« putatively caused by 
technico-economic practices. The common denominator of all such protests is an 
affect of regret, a deploring of the loss of an imagined, unmediated contact with 
»(…) cette sorte d’absolue originaire, de référence indépassable, dont il est rêvé sous le nom de 
Nature.«7 (Canguilhem 1976: 71) For Canguilhem such a position is scientifically 
absurd although he admits, not without a certain self-satisfaction dear to secular 
French thinkers, that the position as well as its associated emotion, could well be 
theologically coherent.8 
All techniques are artificial; this banality, however, does not imply that tech-
niques are metaphysically distinct from or opposed to nature in any ontological way. 
For example, if agricultural techniques are to succeed they must be »rigorously 
conditioned by the very nature of animal and vegetable functions of growth and 
multiplication«. (Canguilhem 1976: 78) This stricture applies to whatever form of 
technology is at issue be it that of peasants, industrial agriculturalists, or organic 
farmers. »L’homme a longtemps semé ce qu’il avait récolté sans l’avoir fait pousser.«9 
(Canguilhem 1976: 79) One can intervene in multiple ways with organic things but 
the things themselves must have the potential to integrate those changes if the 
results are to be anything approaching what those applying the technology had 
sought to bring forth. Certain interventions will do nothing or produce loss; others 
will increase yield or produce unexpected results. Technology can be seen as a mode 
of revealing potentials, not essences.  
Canguilhem draws two major conclusions from this principle. First: »Scientifi-
cally speaking, denaturation is meaningless. Technically speaking, denaturation 
means a change in use. No use is inscribed in the nature of things. The very first use 
of a thing is its denaturation«.10 Or said another way: »It is certain that one does not 
—————— 
 6  »Nature denatured and naturalizing nature.« 
 7  »(…) that originary absolute, essential reference, about which people dream under the name of 
nature.« 
 8  Hence Canguilhem would have equal scorn for those like Luc Ferry who reject ecology in the name 
of a neo-Kantian humanism that sacralizes the subject and Man. 
 9  For a long time, man has harvested that which he has sown without having made it grow. 
 10  »Tels qui croient tenir un langage humaniste usent en fait d’un vocabulaire théologique. 
Scientifiquement parlant, dénaturation n’a pas de sens. Techniquement parlant, dénaturation signifie 
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denature nature in orienting its powers towards effects that are not the usual 
ones«.11 We are only just beginning to learn again how polyvalent and over-deter-
mined organic systems already are; we know very little about their limits. Biotech-
nological interventions will surely teach us more. Such knowledge, like all knowl-
edge, carries with it risks.12 
Security, Danger, Risk  
When discussing risk there is always a definitional question to be addressed, as there 
are many different ways to approach the topic. Here I adopt the distinctions pro-
posed by Niklas Luhmann, in his book, Risk: A Sociological Analysis. Luhmann 
asserts that the world »knows no risks, for it knows neither distinctions, nor expec-
tations, nor evaluations, nor probabilities –unless self-produced by observer systems in the 
environment of other systems«. (Luhmann 1998: 6) This claim means that any discussion 
of risk taking or risk making entails a reflective state of affairs and a decision about 
significance, a perfectly Weberian starting point.  
Risk has been frequently coupled with »security«. This coupling is polemically 
useful but analytically weak. If one opposes something and wants to discredit it then 
it is smart to contrast risk with security (or safety). By so doing one implies that 
there exists a clear choice between a secure state of affairs and one that is not. Of 
course, the problem is that it is hard to see how anyone could choose the undesir-
able conditions rather than the desirable ones. If choosing security is a fool’s para-
dise, another way forward is to make the primary distinction risk/danger instead of 
risk/security. By so doing one shifts the focus from a quest for security to an atten-
—————— 
changement d’usage. Or, aucun usage d’une chose n’est inscrit dans la nature des choses. Le premier 
usage d’une chose est sa dénaturation.« (Canguilhem 1976: 84) 
 11  »Il est certain qu’on ne dénature pas la nature en orientant ses pouvoirs d’effets qui ne lui sont pas 
ordinaires.« (Canguilhem 1976: 85) 
 12  »Parce que la nature ne peut qu’être naturante, une nature dénaturée, à la fois fille et mère de la 
culture, est possible. Parce que cette dénaturation a du emprunter progressivement les voies de 
l’abstraction et de la représentation non-figurative qui sont celles de la science, et que de ce fait on 
n’a pas su reconnaître dans la nature dénaturée la nature naturante, une plainte et une colère sont 
nées, auxquelles la littérature et l’idéologie s’efforcent en vain de donner un poids philosophique.« 
The second point: »Because nature can only be natural, a denatured nature, at one and the same time 
the mother and daughter of culture, is possible. Because that denaturation progressively followed the 
path of abstraction or of non-figurative representation which are those of science, and because of 
this fact one has failed to recognize ›la nature naturante dans la nature dénaturée‹, complaint and anger 
have arisen, and literature and ideology have vainly sought to give these emotions some philosophic 
weight.« (Canguilhem 1976: 87) 
152  M I T T A G S V O R L E S U N G E N  
 
tion to possible future loss. In this mode one can make a link between a potential 
loss and a string of decisions that might lead to it: at that point one is speaking of 
risk, or as Luhmann says »the risk of decision«. Once one begins to operate within 
the logic of risk and danger, the horizon of safety by no means disappears; rather it 
remains unmarked in the linguistic sense. Within the pair of risk/danger one can 
emphasize either side: If one downplays the side of decision making than »the pos-
sible loss is considered to have been caused externally; that is to say, it is attributed 
to the environment. In this case we speak of danger«. (Luhmann 1998: 21) Those 
who mark risk, downplay dangers; »whereas marking dangers allows the profits to 
be forgotten that could be earned if risky decisions are made«. (Luhmann 1998: 24) 
A reflective observer sees that there can be no risk free behavior. Deciding to act 
poses risks of loss in the future but the observer notes that it is equally true that not 
acting carries with it its own consequences.  
Luhmann draws two further consequences relevant here. He calls the first, »the 
contingency schema«. If one is concerned with the issue of future loss and of deci-
sion making, then we are faced with »two temporal contingencies, event and loss are 
firmly coupled as contingencies (not as facts!), this makes it possible for observers 
to differ in the way they see things. Temporal contingencies provoke social contin-
gencies, and this plurality, cannot be cancelled out by an ontological formula. 
(Luhmann 1998: 17) For Luhmann accepting contingency means taking up a mod-
ern ethos toward the modern world.  
Luhmann’s second insight rejoins Canguilhem: »Modern risk oriented society is 
a product not only of the perception of the consequences of technological achieve-
ment. Its seed is contained in the expansion of research possibilities and of knowl-
edge itself«. (Luhmann 1998: 28) The more science we do, the more knowledge we 
make, the more technological intervention becomes possible, the more choices are 
posed, the more risk there is, the more the imperative to act or not to act imposes 
itself. And that point must be the beginning of seeing what difference today makes 
with respect to yesterday: vigilance and intervention même combat.  
Contemporary Formations 
Although Habermas, Canguilhem and Luhmann are helpful in different ways: none 
of them sufficiently problematizes the contemporary. Habermas is hyper-vigilant 
about dangers; his diagnostic of the present leads him to seek transcendental pro-
tection – the moral is untouched by the ethical – thereby deterring him from staying 
close to those changes, and consequently devoting himself to thinking about, or 
evaluating, them in their specificity and singularity, that is to say in their reality. 
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Luhmann (for reasons that would take longer to explain) provides an epochal diag-
nosis of modernity as based on contingency but by so doing he slips into a position 
of a first-order observer, a position that a second-order observer would have to 
qualify as contingent. Luhmann knows this but even he is carried away into reifying 
modernity as risk society. Canguilhem acutely analyzes shifting scientific and tech-
nological changes but takes them up as fundamentally unproblematic; while such a 
position entails that he keep close to emerging practices of knowledge, it does not 
allow him to pay sufficient attention to the risk dimension that such practices open 
up. An anthropology of the contemporary, thus, faces the challenge of finding a 
means to remain close to diverse current practices producing knowledge, ethics, and 
politics, while adopting an attitude of discernment and adjacency in regard to them, 
thereby providing a space for a more precise and better formulation of contempo-
rary problems and risks. 
We learned from Darwin that humans are part of the animal kingdom. We are 
merely one species among a vast array of living beings, all subject to the great 
scheme of evolution and governed by natural selection. Freud called this insight one 
of the three great blows to humanity’s narcissism. So here we are today, amidst a 
new set of claims and insights, attempting to sort out the scientific wheat from the 
scientific chaff. One touchstone for such sorting is to be attentive to anthropomor-
phic metaphors that pervade scientific prose.  
Researchers at McGill Medical Center recently reported, in a Science article enti-
tled, »Nongenomic Transmission Across Generations of Maternal Behavior and 
Stress Responses in the Rat«, that variations in maternal care seem to influence how 
the young respond to stress – those that are given less care are more stressed. This 
result is not that surprising. Of more interest is the article’s claim to evidence of a 
neo-Lamarckian mode of transmission: the »transmission of such individual differ-
ences in maternal behavior from one generation of females to the next through 
behavior«. This conclusion was arrived at through highly intrusive (if carefully con-
trolled) intervention. Mother rats vary in the degree to which they care for (lick, 
groom and nurse) the pups in their nest. When researchers placed pups from a 
»low-care« mom’s litter into a »high-care« mom’s nest, they observed that these 
pups were less fearful and became »more caring« than other offspring of »low care« 
females. Simply said, more care in one generation yielded more care in the next 
generation. 
The McGill researchers go hurtling down a slippery slope in search of molecules 
(they show that mRNA levels for certain hormones and binding activity of a hor-
mone receptor vary among pups with »low-care« and »high-care« moms). They 
argue that since twin studies »suggest genetic inheritance« plays a role in personality, 
it would make sense to look for such genes in rats. Having established some corre-
lations between rat behavior and the expression of a few genes in their brains, our 
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researchers then conclude that their finding has implications for humans: »In 
humans, social, cultural, emotional and economic contexts influence the quality of 
the relationship between parent and child and can show continuity across genera-
tions. Our findings in rats may thus be relevant in understanding the importance of 
early intervention programs in humans«. The circle is closed. The bow to socially 
useful science has been made. 
The article contains some anthropocentric slips in its tight scientific prose that 
raise warning flags for an anthropologist. For example, »Individual differences in 
personality traits appear to be transmitted from parents to offspring. A critical 
question, however, concerns the mode of inheritance«. Actually, the first critical 
question is the definition of an »individual« in the world of laboratory rats and the 
second question what could be meant by a rat’s »personality«? »Personality« refers 
to »persons«. Persons, from persona in Roman law, are moral figures. There are no 
such beings in the world of rats. Our researchers would do well to a more precise 
vocabulary.  
There is a double take-home message:  
(1)  humanity’s self-image has had a rough millennium (consequently bio-scientists 
should learn to be attentive to their anthropomorphisms);  
(2) whatever your species, love and care for your offspring (support Head Start). 
Opening the door for an understanding of a »mechanism of a non-genomic mode 
of inheritance«, might well show that genes have a range of variability in their 
expression depending on the environment. The same genes express themselves 
differently in different settings. Genes, one should say, are part of a more complex 
picture that must include the genome although that step is hardly the end of the 
story, only the end of a beginning. 
Although one must acknowledge that for reasons that are almost entirely unex-
plored, industrial societies have provided the resources necessary for some to con-
duct a leisured, if not leisurely, exploration of things. Given this space, and for as 
long as it lasts, we should be hard at work thinking, writing, and inquiring. It follows 
that a central question before us is: what form should this writing, thinking, and 
inquiring take? And what norms should govern it? And to what telos does it strive?  
It is easy to agree with one of Habermas’ conclusions:  
»The new technologies make a public discourse on the right understanding of cultural forms of life 
in general an urgent matter. And philosophers no longer have any good reasons for leaving a 
dispute to biologists and engineers intoxicated by science fiction«. (Habermas 2003: 15) 
I agree. I would add, however, that anthropologists no longer have any good reason 
to leave such matters to sober philosophers devoted to an ascetic ideal of an 
undamaged life without risks, as the universal norm of our species morality. Let us 
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return instead to the actual world of the contemporary with its messy ethical prob-
lems, its diverse forms of knowledge, its pedagogical and political challenges. Along 
with Michel Foucault, let me advocate a »patient labor giving form to our impa-
tience for freedom«. Such work may prove irritating and insufficient for some but 
for others it is the path to a Lebensführung worthy of the contemporary, that is to say 
one attentive to emergent logoi claiming to tell us who we really are, ones that need 
to be taken into account, appropriately, as one dimension, but only one dimension, 
of the risky practice of assembling a different figure of anthropos. 
Anthropological inquiry is based first and foremost by listening, observing, 
hearing, seeing, querying, sensing, reflecting, pondering, wondering, and writing, at 
various times during, before and after performing these others actions. Its goal is 
identifying, understanding, and formulating something actual neither by directly 
identifying with it nor by making it exotic. Rather it seeks to articulate a mode of 
adjacency. Such work may be lonely – after all, who else wants to be untimely and 
adjacent – but it can never be done alone. Inquiry proceeds tentatively, using con-
cepts as tools, testing them, and re-fashioning them, in an appropriate manner. How 
to determine what is an »appropriate manner« is one of the central interpretive or 
diagnostics tasks challenging researchers and thinkers. It is often the case that his-
torical work on the concepts one deploys is helpful as these concepts themselves 
were forged to do certain work in different contexts, or better in different assem-
blages and apparatuses, whose singularity must be identified both in the past and in 
the present. Then we will be clearer about what we expect of an appropriate con-
cept. One thing is certain; it will not be a general theory of appropriateness. 
Thus, we are at the end of the beginning once again; and with Max Weber we 
must say: »The only question that remains is the sense in which science (Wissen-
schaft) gives ›no‹ answer, and whether or not science (Wissenschaft) might yet be of 
some use to the one who puts the question correctly«. 
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